The Skeptical Theist’s Reply to the Argument from Divine Hiddenness

 

           In the following essay, I will attempt to dismantle Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness and argue for an alternative perspective for viewing the God-human relationship. First, I will present and clarify Schellenberg’s argument against the existence of God. Following this, I will draw on the premises of skeptical theism to develop a new set of skeptical theses aimed at disproving the argument from divine hiddenness based on the fact that God must exist under different physical conditions than humans do. Finally, I will imagine a counterargument against this skeptical theist perspective and attempt to defend the new theses against it.

 

          In arguing for an atheistic picture of God, J.L. Schellenberg utilizes the concept of divine hiddenness—in other words, the seeming lack of necessary evidence that God could give to humans to support the belief the He does indeed exist and loves them—as an indicator that God does not exist at all. The basic argument goes like this:

 

1. If there is a God, He is perfectly loving.

2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.

3. Reasonable non-belief does occur

4. Thus, no perfectly loving God exists.

5. So, there is no God. [2]

 

         A few of the phrases in these premises require some clarification. The ascribed attribute of a “perfectly loving” God derives from the common monotheistic belief that God is perfect in all aspects, and thus His love for each individual He has created is inseparable from his existence. Additionally, the concept of “reasonable non-belief” is associated with the idea that all those willing to believe in the existence of God should be provided with reasonable access to the route by which a relationship might be formed between that person and God, due to the fact that such a relationship would provide immense value to any individual. If a single willing person is ever unconfident in his belief in God, Schellenberg argues, then God is not adequately providing the tools necessary for the formation of this valuable relationship and thus is not perfectly loving. Schellenberg’s argument is worth a great deal of consideration, but it contains significant weaknesses, particularly upon closer examination of premise two; in assuming that a perfectly loving God would require consistent, confident belief at all times in order to forge a relationship with any person, Schellenberg seems to inappropriately rationalize God’s intentions for His personal relationship with any individual as something that human beings must be able to understand. As the postulates of skeptical theism demonstrate, however, this may not always be the case.

 

            Skeptical theism is a branch of religious philosophy whose primary purpose is to defend the existence of God against the evidential problem of evil. In response to the evidentialist’s assertion that the existence of seemingly “pointless” suffering in the world counts as evidence against God’s existence, skeptical theists have developed three “skeptical theses” in an attempt to counteract this argument:

 

1. We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are.

2. We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are.

3. We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils. [1]

 

          In short, skeptical theists argue that, since God (if he does exist) would be an omnipotent creator of the entire universe, His values (e.g. what is ultimately “good”) may not be directly related to what humans are inclined to value—put another way, God may have reasons for allowing seemingly pointless suffering in the world because allowing such an event to occur will eventually lead to the greatest possible amount of good. These arguments draw on the belief that human perceptions may not be totally in tune with what God perceives; this discrepancy in perception is due to the fact that God exists outside of the physical world and is not a product of it, meaning that His views on value in the universe would not necessarily be identical to those of humans, who developed their perceptions under strict pressure from natural forces.

 

            Due to the ubiquitous relevance of God’s perceptive abilities as compared to human’s, this skeptical argument towards the problem of evil can be applied to many other problems of religious philosophy, including that of divine hiddenness. An analogous set of skeptical theses directed towards this issue might look something like this:

 

1. We have no good reason for thinking that the types of relationships we know of are representative of the types of relationships there are.

2. We have no good reason for thinking that the connections between types of relationships and the value that those types of relationships bring are representative of the connections there are.

 

         This new set of skeptical theses doesn’t carry the same dichotomy as those used to argue against the problem of evil, but their principle remains the same.

 

          In the first thesis, I argue that we have no way of knowing if the type of relationship that God expects to form with an individual person is something that can be predicted based on the types of relationships that humans are used to experiencing, either amongst themselves or with a deistic body. In arguing for atheism, Schellenberg asserts that in order for any person to form a meaningful relationship with God they must always be explicitly aware of his existence. Only with this explicit awareness can true belief, and thus a personal relationship, be formed between that person and God. The absence of this constant awareness is therefore evidence against God’s existence. However, Schellenberg errs in making the assumption that explicit awareness of God is required. For inter-human relationships, this seems to be true; very few meaningful connections could be formed between two individuals if one could not confirm the existence of the other. Human relationships form and grow based on the exchange of empathy between two individuals and physical recognition or contact—the former is extremely unlikely to occur if one can’t be sure of another’s existence, the latter is impossible. Even popularized, yet probably fictitious, relationships between humans and spiritual bodies (e.g. God, angels, ghosts, etc.) usually involve direct confirmation by the human of the other’s presence, whether it be visual (such as Moses viewing the angel of God in the burning bush) or auditory (like Hamlet hearing the eerie command “Remember Me!” from the ghost of his father). Schellenberg’s key error in his line of thought is that he fails to consider God as existing under different physical conditions than human beings; on planet earth, human evolution has been influenced by strict natural laws that favor, among other things, the ability of one organism to unambiguously recognize the presence of another, either for mating or predatory purposes. As such, the value that humans place on confirmation of existence through one of the five senses before attempting to form a relationship may be solely a product of the natural forces of our specific home in the universe. Though a perfect God would have foreknowledge about how exactly the human race would evolve, there’s no reason to think that He would have to restrict himself to methods of forming relationships that human beings are capable of understanding, since He exists outside of the physical limitations that we do. Instead, His method of connecting with any individual person might be something that is incomprehensible as a relationship through the eyes of humans, such as seemingly random reassuring thoughts and emotions, but which ultimately results in the greatest possible good for each individual—an outcome that would thus confirm God’s love. For this reason, it is a popular belief that God might want many people to “long” for a connection with Him throughout their lives—a struggle which ultimately makes the nature of a person’s relationship with God much sweeter than if that person had been consciously sure of His existence the entire time. Thus, since we can never have knowledge about what a loving God knows is ultimately “best” for us, it’s unfair to assume that He would prefer to maintain consistent communication about his intentions.

 

         Similarly, as thesis two argues, we can’t assume that there’s any direct correlation between the nature of the God-human relationship and the benefits that will ultimately come from that relationship. Again, it’s reasonable to believe that human experiences have clouded our objective lens for this matter, as there very frequently seems to be a connection between the consistency of a relationship between two people and the payoff that it brings. It appears that the most valuable types of relationships that can form between two people are those that involve mutual trust and confidence, traits which can only be achieved by slowly building a connection over a long period of time during which the two individuals are able to consistently share ideas, dreams, fears, and any number of other concerns. Humans are driven by many basic instincts but few are as strong as the need to feel as though they’re not totally alone in a violent and chaotic universe, and so the ability to truly and confidently trust another person is something of immense value. With that said, Schellenberg initially appears to be correct when he shows that humans are unable to have such a relationship with God because they lack the necessary, consistently-available mechanism (i.e. the reciprocated communication) by which the relationship could be strengthened; again, however, he unfairly projects human truths towards a situation that, by definition, exists outside of the physical realm. Humans may have developed this intense thirst for direct connection in order to form meaningful relationships as a means to cope and find hope against the backdrop of a seemingly unpredictable world, but we have no reason to believe that this type of trust and confidence is what God would want out of His relationship with us. A perfect God would want only to ensure the best possible outcome for each individual life he creates, and since skeptical theism asserts that we can never know for sure what is best for us, we cannot know how strong of a relationship with Him we should expect to see this come to fruition. For example, a person who is born during a relatively safe period of time amongst a loving and moral family may need less of a confident belief in God in order to live a “good” life whereas a less-fortunately born and placed individual may require a very strong bond with Him to maximize the value of his existence (this is just an example of the potential ambiguity, as skeptical theists maintain that we can have no idea if morality and other attributes humans associate with a “good” life are really representative of what God values). Therefore, it’s inappropriate of Schellenberg to assert that any individual would require a confident, strong relationship with God in order to receive the benefits that such a relationship would provide—namely, God’s unconditional love.

 

          The acceptance of the two skeptical theses presented against the problem of divine hiddenness thus casts doubt on the belief that human beings can have any predictable expectations regarding how a meaningful relationship with God must look; for this reason, it seems reasonable to reject Schellenberg’s argument that, if a loving God truly exists, reasonable non-belief cannot occur. Schellenberg, however, would likely refuse to go down without a fight in this matter and would focus on thesis two of our new skeptical theses in order to present a counterargument. While it might be true that the strength of the relationship between a person and God is not necessarily indicative of the ultimate value that relationship would bring to the individual involved, he would argue, the fact remains that some type of reciprocated connection must be maintained in order for that person to experience the love of God in his life. My argument seems to suggest that if a person were in need of no deistic guidance at some particular point in their lives then God would allow them to exist, at least for a period of time, without any conscious awareness of His presence and still be totally loved by Him. Schellenberg would refute this by saying that, even if the relationship can fluctuate in its strength over time, it must always retain some basal level of connection in order to show God’s love—as he puts it, “The presence of God will be for them like a light that – however much the degree of its brightness may fluctuate – remains on unless they close their eyes.” [3] With this, he seems to indicate that God would show his true love to humans by acting as an omnipresent protector; his constant presence would alleviate the feeling of ever feeling totally alone in the world, which would be his true gift. Since some people, he argues, can go through their entire lives desperately wanting to believe in God but are never able to, this is evidence of God’s absence in the universe.

 

            However, this argument too fails when viewed under the light of skepticism, as it must be to reconcile the extreme differences between the physical and extra-physical worlds. While it does seem plausible to assert that part of the creator-createe relationship would involve a constant, basal level of connection (i.e. God always “watching over” us), we have no reason to assume that such a connection will always manifest itself in ways that humans will be able to recognize as God Himself intervening in their lives. In other words, even if God is always watching over and influencing the conditions of each individual, they need not be totally aware that it is Him in order to experience the full extent of His love. An example of this type of ambiguous perception of protection can be found by extrapolating the concept of John Calvin’s sensus divinitatis.[4] It is a widely held belief that all properly functioning human beings have an inherent ability to believe in a higher power, an ability which might manifest itself as a feeling of awe and optimism upon viewing the vastness of the night sky, among other things. All humans seem to be capable of experiencing situations in which this basic reflex is activated to give them feelings of peace and ultimate protection. Although Calvin argues that this sensation is evidence that the Christian God exists, human history has shown that the sensus divinitatis can inspire many different concepts of a protective body, from the polytheistic creations of the ancient Greeks to the Christian God and everything in between. For this reason, it seems that this sensation described by Calvin could indeed be a tool utilized by God to provide that consistent connection in a way that doesn’t completely reveal to the individual involved that it is indeed Him that is on the other end. This would allow for the apparent truth of divine hiddenness (and thus, cases of reasonable non-belief) without allowing for the possibility that God would totally abandon an individual at any point in their lives.

 

            In sum, Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness falls apart when examined from the perspective of a skeptical theist—an angle from which the argument must be analyzed due to the unavoidable discrepancies in the conditions in which humans exist as opposed to God. As a result, Schellenberg’s conclusion that God does not exist based solely on the absence of consistent evidence seems to be inappropriate, as humans can have no accurate method of predicting how God would actually choose to form a relationship with any individual.

 

Works Cited

• Bergmann, Michael. "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil."NOUS 32 (2): 278-296. Print.

 

• Poston, Ted, and Trent Dougherty. "Divine hiddenness and the nature of belief."Religious Studies 43 : 183-198. Print.

 

• Schellenberg, J. L. (2005). "The hiddenness argument revisited (I)". Religious studies (Cambridge University Press) 41 (2): 201–215

 

• Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. Print.